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How does income inequality affect political representation? Jan Rosset, Nathalie Giger and Julian
Bernauer examine whether politicians represent the views of poorer and richer citizens equally.
They find that in 43 out of the 49 elections included in their analysis, the preferences of low-income
citizens are located further away from the policy positions of the closest political party than those
with mid-range incomes. This suggests that income inequality may spill-over into political
inequalities, although it is less clear whether this effect is likely to get better or worse as a result of
the Eurozone crisis.
Over the last thirty years, there has been a slow but persistent rise in economic inequality across
industrialised countries (see Figure 1). This could be seen as surprising, given that the majority of
these societies are consolidated democracies in which citizens have their say in political decisions.
As far back as the Athenian democracy, Aristotle was pointing to the fact that “in a democracy, the
poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them and the will of the majority is
supreme”. In a similar fashion, economic theory predicts that with an increase in levels of economic
inequality, more people will demand redistribution of incomes via the state and – given the centrality
of the will of the majority in democratic rule – will get their say.
Figure 1: Trend in income inequality in seven OECD countries (1984 – 2010)
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This theory, however, does not take into account the fact that economic inequalities may translate into political
inequalities. Representative democracy relies on elections to create a link between the preferences of the people
and public policies. Formal rules – the “one citizen, one vote” principle – ensure that there is an equal consideration
of each citizen in the voting process. However, despite this principle, representative bodies may reflect the
preferences of richer segments of the citizenry better than others.
It is well-known that citizens with higher levels of economic resources generally participate more in politics. Similarly,
the social background of individuals who run as candidates mirrors more closely that of richer citizens. Given the
role of one’s own lifestyle and everyday experience in defining policy preferences, this may advantage the
translation of preferences of more affluent citizens in the political arena. Finally, if money matters in politics through
the financing of campaigns or party structures for instance, then wealthier citizens have greater means to spread
their message and win elections.
In sum, despite equal political rights, inequality in the representation of the preferences of poor and rich citizens is
likely. If these groups of citizens have opposing policy preferences, this can have severe consequences for public
policy. Considering their own self-interest, we can assume that wealthier individuals are less in favour of
redistribution than their less affluent fellow citizens. If they enjoy more political influence, economic inequalities are
likely to grow beyond the point preferred by the median voter.
Are the preferences of richer Europeans better represented?
Several studies from the US context have shown that political institutions and public policy are indeed most heavily
influenced by the policy preferences of the wealthiest segments of the citizenry, while middle and low income
citizens have virtually no impact on politics. However, for Europe our knowledge about inequalities in the
representation of preferences of rich and poor is very scarce. While the influence of money has traditionally been
perceived as being lower in European politics, there are also good reasons to think that the preferences of richer
European citizens are represented better politically. These inequalities in representation can manifest themselves at
two different levels. First, citizens with low incomes may simply fail to find a party that represents their preferences
and thus lack a political voice. Second, the government formed after the elections can favour the preferences of the
rich, which likely has stronger policy consequences.
Our study of elections in 24 – mostly European – democracies between 1996 and 2007 sheds light on unequal
representation in Europe. Based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, it documents that there
is a consistent pattern of under-representation of the preferences of citizens with low incomes. Preferences of
relatively poor citizens measured along a left-right scale are systematically under-represented by political actors –
be they political parties or governments – in comparison to the preferences of middle-income and high-income
citizens.
This pattern is particularly noticeable in the representation of the poor by the party system. Our analyses, presented
in Figure 2, reveal that citizens belonging to the two lowest quintiles of the income distribution are on average further
away from the most proximate party (i.e. they are less well represented) than median income earners in 43 out of
the 49 elections analysed. In contrast, in a vast majority of elections better-off citizens (i.e. those belonging to the top
40 per cent of the income distribution) are represented more closely by the party system than both the middle-
income and low-income groups.
Even more worrying from an equality perspective is the fact that the poorer representation of low income groups is
greater in more unequal societies. The bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution is even less well represented in
economic contexts where macro-economic inequality is high (as measured by the Gini index of income distribution).
The picture is similar but slightly less clear-cut when looking at inequalities at the governmental level.
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Figure 2: Party policy congruence of poor and rich as compared to those with middle-incomes
Note: The dots show the distance between the preferences of poor (white dot) and rich (black
dot) citizens, and those of the closest political party. The value of 0 on the horizontal axis
indicates the distance between middle-income voters’ preferences and the position of the
closest party. A negative value indicates that citizens were further away (less well
represented) than middle-income voters, while a positive value indicates that citizens were
closer (better represented) than middle-income voters.
In sum, our work shows clear indications that individual and contextual economic inequalities interactively translate
into political inequalities through electoral representation. These results also raise the issue of a potential reinforcing
link between economic and political inequality, in which inequalities in one domain would deepen inequalities in the
other domain.
Nevertheless, the on-going economic crisis and recent political trends may have changed the trajectory of these
developments. In recent years, the rise in economic inequalities has slowed down, mainly due to greater tax
transfers in most OECD countries. The success of left parties in recent elections shows that low-income citizens
have not lost their ability to voice their preferences through elections. Hence, there is no deterministic rise of
economically motivated political inequalities, or in more dramatic words, of plutocracy in disguise.
For a longer discussion of this topic, see the authors’ recent articles in West European Politics, and Representation
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy,
nor of the London School of Economics.
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